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1.  Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to show how efficient lending by an 
insolvent bank can be achieved and to apply this theory to bank closure 
policy. The number of insolvent banks has dramatically increased in recent 
years in Japan. So how we should dispose of an insolvent bank becomes a hot 
topic in Japan. The most popular wisdom is that insolvent banks should be 
liquidated immediately, possibly with the selective assistance by 
government’s deposit insurance agency (GDIA). This paper questions such a 
wisdom because this policy makes the lending project passed up not only with 
negative net present value ( NPV ) but also with positive NPV .  
The major result of this paper is that GDIA can enforce the insolvent 
bank’s efficient lending1 if GDIA stands ready to loan funds to the bank in 
return for the bank’s stockholders giving up their equity claims. So, this 
paper analyzes the new aspect of GDIA that GDIA’s loan can make the bank 
lending efficient although it has long been recognized that existence of GDIA 
gives a bank an incentive to take too much risk.2  We also discuss an 
implication and interpretation of GDIA confiscating the bank’s equity claims. 
And this policy differs from Acharya and Dreyfus (1989)’s claim which a bank 
should be closed whenever its asset-to-deposits ratio falls below a threshold 
which is set to be greater than 1 using the option framework.  
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) consider a situation in which a bank 
lends fund to an insolvent firm that has an investment project. They show 
that depending on parameters there are two cases considered: one is the case 
wherein the project is adopted even though the net present value of the 
project is negative and the other is the case wherein the project is rejected 
even though the net present value is positive3. Our model is related to those 
of Myers (1977)’s and Gertner and Scharfstein (1991)’s; They have analyzed 
problems of investment inefficiency that occurs when the investing firm is 
insolvent. Unlike Myers (1977), we assume that investment returns are 
unknown at the time of investment. We modify the Gertner and Scharfstein 
(1991)’s model so that we can interpret it as a lending firm rather than a 
borrowing firm. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) show that efficiency of 
                                                 
1 To avoid confusion of expression, we use the terminology “lend” whenever the 
insolvent bank provides funds to the firm and the terminology “loan” whenever some 
agent provides funds to the insolvent bank.  
2 Berlin, Saunders and Udell (1991) survey the literature on this moral hazard problem. 
3 Myers (1977) first analyzed this case. 
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investment depends on parameters and that it is by sheer coincidence that 
efficient investment is achieved. But they do not show how efficient 
investment is achieved. In this paper, we examine what kind of agents must 
loan funds to the insolvent bank with project to lend in order to prevent the 
insolvent bank from inefficiently lending. The notion of efficiency of bank 
lending using in this paper requires that all and only positive NPV  lending 
project is carried out regardless of eventual solvency of bank. 
Unlike early papers on deposit insurance, we abstract away from the 
pricing of fair risk-adjusted insurance premium.4 Instead, as in Dreyfus, 
Saunders and Allen (1994), we investigate the caps on insured deposit 
coverage. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section 
we set out the structure of our model. Section 3 analyzes the situation where 
the only role of GDIA is to compensate for depositors. We show that under 
this situation it is purely by chance that efficient bank lending is achieved. 
Section 4 analyzes how the efficient bank lending can be achieved. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
      
 
2.  Basic framework of the analysis  
Throughout a paper, we consider a two-period model in which a bank has 
become insolvent. At the beginning of Date 1, this bank has liquid assets of 
Y  and an opportunity of lending I  dollars in the project to its client firm. In 
Date 2, the bank obtains the return x  from this lending. This x  is random 
variables distributed over the support ),0[ ¥  with the density function f x( ) , 
the cumulative function F x( ) , and the mean x .5 We assume that the bank 
begins Date 1 with the total deposits in the amount of D . Fraction q  of the 
deposits, however, will be withdrawn by depositors during Date1; the 
remaining ( )1- q  of D  will become due in Date 2. Fraction q  is taken as 
exogenous in this paper. The interest rate on the existent deposit D  is 
normalized to be zero and all parties are risk neutral. We shall ignore “bank 
run” in the analysis by assuming that GDIA can credibly insure all deposits. 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Merton (1977) and Ronn and Verma (1986). 
5 Here the functional form may be arbitrary. We can show that the main results in this 
paper hold when x  is specified as the return to the insolvent bank from the standard 
debt contract.   
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That the bank is already insolvent at the beginning of Date 1 can be 
expressed as follows:  
 A1.  Y < D . 
Figure 1 described the balance sheet of the bank at the beginning of the Date 
1. Thus if the bank is resolved, stockholders receive nothing because of 
absolute priority rule. So, stockholders have the incentive to finance an 
investment dollar I  whenever the bank can borrow the invest amount. 
Since the bank’s stockholders receive nothing in case of the declaration 
of bankruptcy to investing project, they are willing to borrow and finance 
regardless of its returns. In other words, we assume situations wherein the 
bank must raise ( )I qD Y+ - > 0  in Date 1 to implement the investment, 
that is, lending to the firm. This is described as   
 A2.  Y I qD< + . 
Under A1 and A2, whether the lending to the firm is adopted or not 
depends on the decision by the agent who loans funds to the insolvent bank. 
We call this agent as a financing agent. The sequence of events and decisions, 
described in figure 2, is as follows. In Date 1, the insolvent bank lends funds 
of I  to the firm and pays off the deposit maturing at Date 1 of qD . Under 
A1 and A2, it must raise funds ( )I qD Y+ - . The financing agent decides 
whether to loan or not. If the bank cannot raise the needed funds in Date 1, it 
simply defaults either at the end of Date 1 (the case of Y qD£ ) or during 
Date 2 (the case of Y qD³ ). 
In Date 2, if the insolvent bank can raise funds and lend to the firm, it 
gets returns on lending x  and pays off the deposits maturing in Date 2, 
( )1- q D  and funds with interest of r  to the financing agent, 
( )1+ r ( ).I qD Y+ -  So, debt obligations of the insolvent bank at Date 2 
amount to z q D r I qD Yº - + + + -( ) ( )( )1 1 . Note that the insolvent bank pays 
the new depositors at r  percent interest rate. This is because the insolvent 
bank needs to raise deposits at higher interest rate.   
Of course, the ability of the bank to finance the firm’s investment project 
depends on availability of the financing agent willing to loan to the defact 
insolvent bank. In this paper, potential financing agents who loan funds to 
the insolvent bank are GDIA, new depositors, a financing bank, old 
stockholders, and new stockholders.6 We assume that the insolvent bank 
                                                 
6 We call a bank that loans funds to the insolvent bank as a financing bank to 
distinguish between these two banks. And we call existent depositors (stockholders) 
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raises all its needed funds, I qD Y+ - , from one agent only.  
We define efficient lending that the lending is achieved, if and only if 
the net present value (NPV ) of the lending is non-negative, where NPV  is 
defined as NPV xf x dx I x Iº - º -
¥
ò ( )0 . The problem is that the financing 
agents do not use this criterion as a bench mark of loaning to the insolvent 
bank. They offer funds as far as the expected return to them is nonnegative. 
And these two criteria usually differ. In what follows, we examine what kind 
of agents should loan to the insolvent bank in order to achieve the efficient 
lending.    
 
 
3.  Bank lending without GDIA’s loan 
In this section, the only role of GDIA is to compensate for loss of 
deposits.7 We analyze the case where the insolvent bank raises funds with 
interest from new depositors, a financing bank, old stockholders, or new 
stockholders and show that the bank lending to a firm becomes inefficient in 
any case.  
 
 
3.1.  Financing with new deposits 
In this subsection, we analyze the model in which the insolvent bank 
raises all its lending funds from new depositors only, namely amount of new 
deposit is equal to I qD Y+ - . We assume that unlike old depositors, new 
depositors stay bank till the end of Date 2. As deposits are completely insured 
by GDIA, the expected net returns of the new depositors are given by  
 
(1)   [ ] )()()1()()(
0
YqDIdxxfDqZdxxfYqDI
Z
Z
-+---+-+ òò
¥
 . 
 
The first term is the gross present value of new deposits in the case of 
bank’s liquidation. This means that even if the insolvent bank cannot meet 
debt obligations Z  in Date 2, new depositors recover principal I qD Y+ -  
from GDIA. The second term is the gross present value of new deposits when   
                                                                                                                                               
owning deposits (equities) at the beginning of Date 1 as old depositors (stockholders). 
7 The case of GDIA directly loaning to the insolvent bank is analyzed in the next 
section. 
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the bank realizes returns exceeding Z . This means that when returns on 
lending of the insolvent bank are more than Z , new depositors get principal 
and interest.  
Equation (1) can be transformed into  
 
(2)  r I q D Y f x d x
Z
( ) ( )+ -
¥
ò ,  
 
which is positive under A2. 
The insolvent bank can raise funds from new deposits and therefore lend 
regardless of returns on lending because people can profit from the deposits. 
It is convenient for the insolvent bank’s stockholders to raise funds from 
deposits because stockholders have the incentive to lend regardless of net 
present value of lending. This means that GDIA makes completely insured 
depositors willing to supply an unlimited amount of deposits regardless of the 
bank’s returns on lending. We call this effect moral hazard problem of 
depositors caused by GDIA.8  Let us call that under-lending problem is 
occurred if a lending project with positive NPV  is passed up and 
over-lending problem if a lending project with negative NPV  is carried out. 
Then, we get the following lemma.   
 
Lemma1: When the insolvent bank raises funds from deposit, it never 
causes under-lending problem, but can cause over-lending problem.  
 
 
3.2.  Raising funds from the financing bank9 
The financing bank loans to the insolvent bank if net returns of 
                                                 
8 Our result holds in case where the insolvent bank pays a premium to GDIA in raising 
fund from new deposits. We define p  as flat insurance premium per deposit. So the 
bank must raise funds [ / ( ) ] ( )1 1 - + -p I qD Y  in Date 1. But as long as deposits are 
completely insured by GDIA, new depositor’s action does not change. That is, 
irrespective of N P V  of lending project, new depositor deposits money in this bank. 
9 We assume that the financing bank’s debt is junior to deposits. And we are assuming 
implicitly that no other bank can have access to this project investment on the ground 
that there is the ongoing monitoring and screening investment requisite to the 
idiosyncratic investment for other lenders, which cannot be easily transferable to other 
lenders without having invested in the long term relationship. So, if the insolvent bank 
cannot raise funds, even the project with positive N P V  may be passed up. These 
forgone benefits are called the charter value.  
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financing bank with financing are more than those without financing. This 
condition is described as           
 
(3)  [ ] [ ]
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
1
1 1 0
-
¥
ò ò- - + - - - + - ³q D
Z
Z
x q D f x dx Z q D f x dx I qD Y  
  
The left-hand side of inequality (3) is net returns of the financing bank 
when it loans to the insolvent bank. The right-hand side of inequality (3) is 
returns that the financing bank receives when it does not loan to the 
insolvent bank. This is because that the financing bank has only projects to 
lend with zero interest rate, so that the financing bank’s opportunity cost is 
zero.10       
The first term in equation (3) has the integral sign from ( )1- q D  to Z , 
reflecting the fact that the bank’s depositors have higher debt seniority on 
the insolvent bank than the financing bank. The second term in equation (3) 
is gross present value of the financing bank when returns on lending of the 
insolvent bank are more than Z . Since Z q D- -( )1 = ( )( )1+ + -r I qD Y , the 
second integration is simply the financing bank’s principal and interest. This 
means that the financing bank gets principal and interest when returns on 
the insolvent bank’s lending are more than the insolvent bank’s amount of 
debt obligations in Date 2. The third term is amount of loan by the financing 
bank to the insolvent bank. We transform equation (3) into the following 
equation, which enables us to judge about efficiency of bank lending. 
 
(4)  NPV òò ò
¥- ¥
-
-+úû
ù
êë
é --++³
z
Dq
Dq
dxxfZxYdxxDfqdxxxfqD )()()()1()(
)1(
0 )1(
 
         º - +V Y S , 
 
where V qD xf x dx q Df x dx
q D
q D
º + + -
-
¥-
òò ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1
10
1
 and S x Z f x dx
Z
º -
¥
ò ( ) ( ) . 
The first term on the right-hand side is what the depositors withdraw in 
Date 1. The second term is the expected amount that the insolvent bank pays 
out to the depositors in Date 2 in case it actually fails and cannot meet the 
full deposit obligations in Date 2. The third term describes the case in which 
the insolvent bank can meet the full deposit obligations in Date 2, ( )1- q D . 
                                                 
10 All our results hold even in general case where opportunity cost is non zero.  
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Note in this case that the insolvent bank may or may not be bankrupt.11 So, 
the first three terms on the right-hand side, which we sum up as V ,  describe 
what the insolvent bank pays out to depositors if it obtains loans from the 
financing bank. 12  The fourth term of Y  describes what the bankrupt 
insolvent bank pays out to depositors in Date 1 if the invest project cannot be 
financed. The fifth term of ( ) ( )x Z f x dx
Z
-
¥
ò , which we shall call S , is the 
expected returns that stockholders get when the insolvent bank raises funds 
and therefore lends to the firm.  
V Y-  is the transfer from the financing bank to depositors conditional 
on bank lending because depositors get Y  if the insolvent bank cannot lend 
to the firm. S  is the transfer from the financing bank to stockholders 
conditional on bank lending because equity value is zero if the insolvent 
bank cannot lend to the firm. The interpretation of inequality (4) is that if the 
NPV  exceeds the sum of these transfers, the financing bank loans to the 
insolvent bank and the bank lending can be carried out.  
The notion of efficiency of bank lending using in this paper requires that 
all and only positive NPV  lending project is carried out regardless of 
eventual solvency of bank. Efficient lending means that only if NPV≧0, the 
bank lending is carried out and if not, it is not carried out. The problem is 
that the financing agents do not necessarily use its criterion as a bench mark 
of loaning to the insolvent bank. The financing bank loans whenever NPV  
exceeds V Y S- +  which may be positive or negative. In other words, this 
loan by a financing bank results in either over- or under-lending depending 
on the parameters Y , q , D  and f x( ) .  
For example, when almost all of depositors draw out their deposits in 
Date 1 (q ≒ 1) , the right-hand side of inequality (4) must be positive 
(under-lending).13 When an excess of liabilities over asset is small (D Y- ≒
0)  and the financing bank gets all of the return by setting r  sufficiently 
high, the right-hand side of inequality (4) can be negative (over-lending). 
These show that over-lending and under-lending can occur depending on 
                                                 
11 The insolvent bank defaults if x  is less than Z  and does not default if x is more 
than Z .  
12 As deposits are completely insured by GDIA, D V-  is net expected payments of 
GDIA to depositors. 
13 In this case, V D= , so that we can write (4) as N P V ≧ D Y S- + . As both D Y-  
and S  are positive, respectively, efficient lending is not achieved, even if ¥®r . 
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parameters.  
To summarize this finding, 
 
Lemma 2: When the insolvent bank raises funds from the financing bank, 
it can cause both under-lending problem and over-lending problem. 
 
 
3.3.  Raising funds from old stockholders14   
In this subsection, we investigate the situation wherein the insolvent 
bank issues stocks and all these stocks are purchased by incumbent 
stockholders. To simplify analysis, we assume that there is no agency 
problem among old stockholders.15 And we assume that each old stockholder 
purchases newly issued stocks proportionally to his holding equities. Let the 
ratio of number of equities owned by the j-th old stockholder before the new 
issue be qj . Then, because the j-th old stockholder purchases the ratio qj  of 
newly issued equities, his holding ratio remains the same level of qj . So, the 
j-th old stockholder purchases the equities if { [ ] dxxfDqx
Dqj
)()1(
)1(
--ò
¥
-
q  
}- + - ³( ) .I qD Y 0  Summing up this inequality over the stockholders, we get  
   
(5)  [ ]
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) .
1
1 0
-
¥
ò - - - + - ³q D x q D f x dx I qD Y  
  
The left-hand side of inequality (5) is what old stockholders receive when 
they purchase newly issued equities and the lending of the insolvent bank 
can be carried out. The first term shows that the stockholders get returns 
only when returns on lending are more than obligations of deposits maturing 
in Date 2. The second term is the total amount of newly issued stocks that the 
stockholders purchase. The right-hand side is what the stockholders receive 
when they do not purchase newly issued stocks and the lending of the 
insolvent bank cannot be carried out because the bank is insolvent. 
Inequality (5) can be transformed into  
 
                                                 
14 We call stockholders owning equities at the beginning of Date 1 as old stockholders. 
15 This means that the old stockholders behave as if they were one agent. This 
assumption is not crucial to our analysis. 
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(6)   NPV ³ V Y- . 
  
V Y-  can be positive or negative, so this loan results in either under- 
lending or over-lending. Inequality (6) is equal to inequality (4) when S = 0 . 
Thus, the loan condition under which the insolvent bank raises funds from 
the old stockholders is equal to that under which the insolvent bank raises 
funds from the financing bank when S = 0 . 
To summarize this finding, 
 
Lemma 3: When the insolvent bank raises funds from old stockholders, it 
can cause both under-lending problem and over-lending problem. But raising 
funds from old stockholders results in under-lending problem less frequently 
than raising funds from the financing bank.  
 
 
3.4.  Raising funds from new stockholders 
In this subsection, we assume that the newly issued stocks are 
purchased by the people except old stockholders.16 Let the number of equities 
owned by the old stockholders be M  at the beginning of Date 1 and the 
number of newly issued equities be N , so that the total number of equities 
becomes M N+ . To simplify analysis, we assume that there is no agency 
problem among the new stockholders. 
The condition under which the new stockholders purchase the stocks is 
given by 
 
(7)    [ ]N
M N
x q D f x dx I qD Y
q D+
- - - + - ³
-
¥
ò ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 01 , 
 
which can be transformed into  
 
(8)  NPV ³ - +
+
V Y
M
M N
S . 
 
The right-hand side of (8) is bigger than that of (6) by 
M
M N
S
+
 which is 
                                                 
16 This means that old stockholders do not purchase the new issue. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) call such stockholders the “passive” old stockholders. 
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the equity value of old stockholders.17 This means that the new stockholders 
have less incentive to purchase the new issues than the old stockholders 
because the new stockholders get only part of equity value. 
Thus, we obtain the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 4: When the insolvent bank raises funds from the new stockholders, 
it can cause both under-lending problem and over-lending problem. It is 
likely to cause under-lending problem compared with the case of raising 
funds from the old stockholders. 
 
The following result formalizes the above discussion: 
 
P r o p o s i t i o n１:  If deposits are all insured by GDIA, then efficient bank 
lending is achieved only by coincidence of parameters when financing agents 
are depositors, a financing bank, old stockholders, and new stockholders. 
 
In the literature dealing with regulatory bank closure policy, the policy 
that government keeps an insolvent bank in operation until asset maturity is 
called as forbearance policy. Some papers point out that there are benefits for 
forbearance policy. For example, Nagarajan and Sealey (1995) show that 
forbearance can make bank select better assets ex ante in the presence of 
moral hazard. Dreyfus, Saunders and Allen (1994) show that forbearance 
policy may be an optimal policy ex post. On the other hand, we examined an 
effect of forbearance policy on efficiency of bank lending in this section. 
Proposition 1 shows that without GDIA’s direct loan, once the bank is 
insolvent, forbearance policy makes bank lending inefficient.  
 
 
 4.   Bank lending with GDIA’s loan 
The analysis so far has taken it as given that the only role of GDIA is to 
compensate for loss of deposits. In this section, we assume that GDIA can also 
loan to the insolvent bank directly.   
                                                 
17 We can also interpret that M
M N
S
+
 is the transfer from the new stockholders to 
the old stockholders conditional on bank lending because the equity value of the old 
stockholders is zero if the insolvent bank cannot lend to the firm. 
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 4.1.  Raising funds from GDIA  
As GDIA compensates depositors for all their losses, GDIA has to be 
burdened with Y D-  if it does not loan to the insolvent bank. And even if it 
loans to the insolvent bank, it has to be burdened with depositors’ losses when 
returns on lending to the firm by the insolvent bank do not suffice for 
liabilities of deposits. Thus, GDIA loans funds of I qD Y+ -  to the insolvent 
bank if 
 
(9)   [ ] [ ] [ ]
0
1
1
1 1 1
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
-
-
¥
ò ò ò- - + - - + - -
q D
q D
Z
Z
x q D f x dx x q D f x dx Z q D f x dx  
      - + -( )I qD Y ( )³ -Y D . 
 
The left-hand side of inequality (9) is the net present value of GDIA 
when it loans to the insolvent bank. The first term is what GDIA bears for the 
depositors who withdraw their deposits in Date 2 when returns on lending of 
the bank are less than obligations of deposits maturing in Date 2. The second 
term is returns that GDIA gets when returns on lending are more than 
obligations of deposit maturing in Date 2 but less than total debt obligations 
of Z . The third term shows that GDIA gets a principal and interest when 
returns on lending are more than total obligations in Date 2. The fourth term 
is funds that GDIA loans to the bank. The right-hand side is the net present 
value of GDIA when it does not loan to the insolvent bank.  
Inequality (9) can be transformed into 
 
(10)   NPV ³ S .  
 
S  is by no means negative, so this shows that under-lending problem 
can occur, although over-lending problem never occurs. However, S  
converges 0 as r ® ¥ . That r ® ¥  means that GDIA gets not only the 
principal of the loan but also all the equity value, while the existent 
stockholders get nothing. Infinite interest rate is unrealistic. However, the 
same result can be obtained if GDIA obtains the whole equities at Date 1 and 
becomes the only stockholder of the insolvent bank. Note that the equity 
value is zero at Date 1, so that GDIA need not pay to stockholders for the 
acquisition. This is exactly the nationalization of Long-Term Credit Bank of 
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Japan and Nippon Credit Bank in 1998 in Japan.      
 
The following result formalizes the above discussion: 
 
P r o p o s i t i o n  2：When GDIA loans to the insolvent bank and gets all 
equity value of the insolvent bank, efficient lending is achieved without 
depending on parameters. 
   
That GDIA becomes the only stockholder of the insolvent bank implies 
that it assumes unlimited liability because of its obligation of compensation 
for deposit loss. And it is why GDIA loan achieves the efficiency of lending. 
We will show that once bank stockholders accept an unlimited liability 
for their deposits,18 they advance the funds only when the bank lending is 
efficient. At Date 1, they loan (or they purchase the issues) I qD Y+ - to the 
insolvent bank and at Date 2 they get x q D- -( )1  because when x  is less 
than ( )1- q D  they must compensate the deposits matured at Date 2. So 
their net returns are x I Y D- + - , if they loan to the insolvent bank. If they 
do not loan to the insolvent bank, they get Y D- , which is negative. So, only 
if NPV x Iº - ³ 0 , they prefer to loan to the insolvent bank rather than not 
to loan although their net returns are negative unless x I D Y- ³ - . 
Although stockholders’ liability is limited in the real world, only GDIA that 
obtained the whole equities functions as the stockholders in the unlimited 
liability.          
 
 
4 . 2 .   Caps on insured deposits19 
Thus far, we showed that efficient lending was achieved on the 
assumption that deposits were all insured. In Japan, GDIA has insured all 
the deposits including interest, so that this assumption applies in Japan until 
2001. However, it is scheduled to change the system that only deposits less 
                                                 
18 John, John, and Senbet (1991) show that the moral hazard problem of banks taking 
on excessive risk arises from existence of the limited liability and the associated convex 
payoff to stockholders. 
19 Dreyfus, Saunders and Allen (1994) first analyze the optimality of caps on insured 
deposits. They show that raising a cap on insurance coverage and allowing the bank to 
keep running for an additional period may actually serve to lower GDIA’s failure 
resolution cost.  
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than ten million yen are insured by GDIA. In this subsection, we will 
examine whether our results hold in the system where only a part of deposits 
is insured. Because actual provisions are too complex to formalize, we 
analyze the following two cases: one is the case wherein GDIA insures a 
certain ratio of the total deposits of the insolvent bank and the other is the 
case wherein GDIA insures a certain amount of deposits that is independent 
of the total outstanding deposits. 
When GDIA insures a certain ratio of the deposits, gD , 0 1< <g , GDIA 
loans funds to the insolvent bank, if   
 
(11)  [ ] [ ]
0
1
1
1 1
g
g
g g
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
-
-
¥
ò ò- - + - -
q D
q D
x q D f x dx x q D f x dx
 
- + - ³ -( ) ,I q D Y Y Dg g  
     
which we can transform into NPV ³ 0.   
The left-hand side of inequality (11) is the net present value of GDIA 
when it loans to the insolvent bank. The first term is what GDIA bears for the 
depositors who withdraw their deposits in Date 2, in the case that returns on 
lending of the insolvent bank are less than obligations of deposits maturing 
in Date 2. The second term is returns that GDIA gets when returns on 
lending of the insolvent bank are more than obligations of deposit maturing 
in Date 2. The third term is funds that GDIA loans to the bank. The 
right-hand side is the net present value of GDIA when it does not loan to the 
insolvent bank.  
When GDIA insures a certain amount of deposits, D  ( D D< ), GDIA has 
to be burdened with Y D- , if it does not loan to the insolvent bank. And if it 
loans to the insolvent bank, it has to be burdened with D x-  when returns 
on lending do not suffice for liabilities of deposits and gets x D-  when 
returns on lending suffice for liabilities of deposits. Thus, GDIA loans funds of 
I qD Y+ -  to the insolvent bank, if 
 
(12) [ ] [ ]x q D f x dx x q D f x dx I qD Y Y Dq D
q D
- - + - - - + - ³ -
-
-
¥
ò ò( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 1
0
1
1
, 
  
which we can transform into NPV ³ 0.  
The following result formalizes the above discussion: 
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P r o p o s i t i o n  3 ：Even if only a part of the deposits is insured, efficient bank 
lending can be achieved, if GDIA loans to the insolvent bank, and gets all 
equity value of stockholders. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Myth that Japanese banks do not bankrupt is collapsing. So, now in 
Japan we need to consider how to resolve problems stemming from the bank 
bankruptcy. So far, only the safety of the deposits has been focused on and 
the influence on the firms and bank lending has not been considered. 
However, moral hazard problem that stockholders (or managers) of the bank 
in financial difficulties tend to execute inefficient lending is also serious and 
should be resolved. This paper analyzes the closure policy of the insolvent 
bank from a viewpoint of efficiency of lending and shows that in order to 
achieve efficient bank lending, the financing agent should be GDIA who is 
given the right to acquire all the surplus, if it emerges. This finding 
highlights a new role of GDIA. 
The policy implication of our findings is that once the bank is insolvent 
government should take not the forbearance policy but the prompt 
nationalization of the bank by GDIA in order to achieve efficient bank 
lending. Actually, in Japan, in accordance with Article 36 of “the Law 
Concerning Emergency Measures for the Revitalization of the Functions of 
the Financial System”, which was legislated in 1998, GDIA acquired all 
shares of the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank 
and provided necessary support for loans. This newly adopted financial 
regulation just corresponds to the procedure proposed in this paper to achieve 
efficient lending by the insolvent banks.    
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Figure１: Balance sheet of the insolvent bank at the      
             beginning of Date 1 
 
                            
 
  asset  Y   D  value of deposit                  
 
             S  value of equity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Time occurrence of the events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
（Date1） （Date 2） 
• Depositors withdraw qD. 
• Insolvent bank raises       
  funds of (I+qD-Y) and  
   lends I. 
 • Project pays out x. 
 • Depositors withdraw (1-q)D. 
 • Insolvent bank pays his debt. 
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